A conception of the state that is incompatible with the deep preferences of a large majority of its population may well lead to deep unrest and to violence. Ideologically, giving up on the idea of a state that is in some senses Jewish is giving up on the ideal of Jewish political self-determination. The implication is that political Zionism is, and maybe has always been, misguided and misconceived. While some have been advancing this view for a long time, this conclusion implies a major re-assessment of one of the major movement of national liberation of the 20th century. The reluctance to endorse it a-priori thus seems to me unjustified. I prefer a systematic and serious attempt to study the tension between these elements and seek to mitigate it, rather than argue at the outset for a solution that is either purely Jewish or totally democratic.
Democracy is a vulnerable type of political regime. There are waves of democratization – and waves of their collapse. In most parts of the world, countries do not attain democracy, or lose their democratic regimes, because of their ‘Jewishness’. In fact, even Israel’s bitter critics concede that, in the region, Israel is the state with the most developed democratic regime. Many democracies have stable particularistic ethnic and national cultures, which do not undermine their democracy. True, the nation-state is under attack in all parts of the Western world. On the other hand, the drive for ethnic and national self-determination is anything but weakening in many parts of then world. Primordial affiliations of religion and ethnic origin prove to be much more resistant than many had expected (or hoped). In Israel, too, some of the threats to democracy do not stem from the Jewishness of the state in any of its many senses. In short, it will be a mistake to think that the Jewishness of Israel is the immanent and only enemy of democracy in it.
On the other hand, Jews and Jewishness may be under threat, in Israel as well as in other places, because of forces, which are not related to democracy. In general, the rights of Jews to life, and their civil and political rights, are more protected in democratic countries than they are in other countries. On the other hand, liberal democracies create for Jews risks of assimilation and loss of identity.
These general observations suffice to suggest that there is nothing in the nature of the combination, in Israel, between Jewishness and democracy, that justifies an a priori rejection of the possibility of a combination of the two. Yet we saw that in Israel, the combination does indeed cause unique issues. Since Israel is the only country in the world with a Jewish majority, it is also the only state in the world in which democracy and some sense of Jewishness may in fact reinforce each other. On the other hand, a serious challenge to the democratic nature of the state stems from certain readings of its Jewishness. And a serious threat to its Jewishness may follow from a blind commitment to some readings of what is implied by democracy.
My decision to concentrate on studying ways of combining democracy and a Jewish distinctness is based on my conclusion that such a combination is possible, and on the normative conclusion that, under present circumstances, it is preferable to all available plausible alternatives from the perspectives of all concerned. Nonetheless it is important to stress that while the combination is possible, it is not inevitable or even self-evident. In both of the major divides – these between Jews and Arabs and between secular and religious Jews – the cohesiveness and the willingness to accept compromise are weakening. This fact may undermine the conditions for the stability of the combination between democracy and Jewish distinctness. The impressive achievements of the first 50 years of Israel’s existence do not guarantee that Israel can continue to be a stable and a flourishing state.
The achievements are truly impressive. Political Zionism has led, together with other complex political and social forces, to the establishment of the state of Israel. Israel managed to withstand an early challenge to its integrity and security, and managed to build a state with a large Jewish majority. Israel is now the home of almost a half of the Jewish people in the world, and is a lively center of Jewish life. The generation of the Founding Fathers, the last generation of the exile, was probably more familiar with things Jewish, and more Zionistic in its aspirations, than the present generations of Jews living in Israel. However, for Jews living in Israel, the existence of a state with a Jewish majority, whose language is a rich and lively Hebrew, and whose public culture is Jewish and Hebrew, are all things taken for granted. Israel is a country illustrating development, initiative, energy and commitment. The development of Israel democracy, both within the Jewish sectors and among Jews and Arabs, is impressive. Israel today has more freedom of expression and of protest, and more freedom of political and social association, than it had when it was founded. The situation of the Israeli Arabs is improving, and their political power is on the rise. Similarly, access of groups that used to be on the periphery to the center has also greatly improved. Israel sees processes of maturing of political processes and institutions, an increased interest in the transparency and integrity of the political echelons, and an empowerment of civil society and its institutions. All of these are aided by a strong and independent judicial system, headed by Israel’s Supreme Court, and by a strengthened state controller, and robust public and press coverage. The ‘third sector’ of NGOs and civil society has become much more pronounced and visible. All these processes are still in place despite the fact that since October 2000, and for over a year, Israel has been in the midst of a violent confrontation with its Palestinian neighbors, facing an economic crisis that was worsened by the September 11 2001 attacks on the USA.
Yet justified pride in these achievements should not make us oblivious to the challenges of the present and the future. Israel has not yet reached a political agreement with its neighbors. In particular, it has found no adequate response to the Palestinian claim that they should be allowed to exercise their own right to self-determination in a state of their own. As a result, Israel has been controlling, for over 30 years now, all the land that belonged to the pre-1947 Palestine. This occupation inevitably leads to systematic efforts at surveillance and control over the Palestinian population, large parts of which seek to resist it. The Oslo process, which started in 1993, was an attempt to end this situation by an agreement between the parties. The process raised mixed feelings among both Jews and Palestinians, leading to intensive acts of protest on both sides. The protest led to the assassination of PM Rabin in November 1995, and to a series of terrorist attacks on Jewish civilians. As a result, the process was halted by Netanyahu’s government in 1996-1999, and collapsed after the failed Camp David talks in 2000. At this moment (January 2002), a years’ long cycle of violence left hundreds dead on both sides, with a political arrangement seeming unlikely in the near future.
In Israel, these developments are having mixed effects. The tensions within Israel among Jews and Arabs have never been deeper. In October 2000, just as the unrest started in the territories, violent protests and demonstrations started in many concentration of Arab population in Israel. 12 civilians were killed in clashes with police before order was restored. As a result, a majority of Arabs has boycotted the 2001 election of the PM. As prospects of a political agreement with the Palestinians seem further away, the predicament of the Israeli Arabs grows. Claims for greater civic equality are made, but at the same time the challenge of the legitimacy of Israel’s Jewish nature, and active support of the forces fighting against it, become more visible. These in turn raise a public debate about the loyalty of the Arab citizens of Israel to their country. While there seems to be some debate within the Arab population on the stance they should take under these circumstances, the vocal and political representation is, on the whole, conflictual and radicalized.
This debate, as well as the continuing debate over the future of the territories, increase the intensity of the right-left divide. There are some voices among the Jewish population calling for an immediate return to the negotiating table, coupled with a refusal to serve in the IDF. On the other hand, the state of emergency and the reality of daily violence have created an incentive for a unity government, in which Labor and Likkud cooperate. There are some initiatives to seek a new Jewish agreement on this range of issues. On the other hand, the internal Jewish divides are deep, and there is opposition from some of these groups to these attempts and compromises. Forces within the Jewish sector are therefore mixed, and pulling in different directions.
The continuing security challenge does not allow the systematic treatment of Israel’s serious social problems. At the same time, high unemployment and growing gaps seriously affect the ability of Israeli society to withstand a prolonged war of attrition. Israeli society has stood the challenge of the second uprising surprisingly well. It is not clear how much longer it can take it without serious erosion.
Ironically, despite the serious security and economic problems in Israel, it is still a haven for many. Jews and family members of Jews come under the law of return, and there is an estimated quarter of a million foreign workers in Israel, over half of them illegal. The demographic issues become even more charged when we recall that one of the primary stumbling blocks of the political agreement with the Palestinian is the resolution of the problem of the refugees. The official Palestinian position has always been that the issue should be resolved by letting the refugees (and their descendants) choose between actually returning to their homes and settling down elsewhere with compensation. The Israeli position on this issue, as on many others, is not very clear. Initially, and for many years, Israel expressed a clear and unequivocal objection to any ‘actual return’ as part of the negotiated deal. In Camp David and Taba, it seems that some Israeli politicians are willing to consider various formulas that might concede a principle of ‘return’ with some practical caps on the persons that will be allowed to return to Israel itself.
In this book I made a deliberate decision not to discuss the issues of the contours of the political arrangement between Israel and the Palestinians in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. This decision is based on the realization that tensions between democracy and the Jewish distinctiveness of Israel will persist even if the solution to this tension is the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. In fact, this development was the assumption against which I have conducted my analysis. This assumption seemed plausible at the time (1995-1997).
At this time, as the prospects of an early agreement seem dimmer, I must address the present situation as well. It is important to see that the overall picture has not changed despite the political upheavals of the 1990s. The justification for allowing Jews to have self determination in their ancient homeland, that led to the 1947 UN decision, has not weakened over time. To the contrary, it has strengthened. Nonetheless, this right does not detract from the parallel right of the Palestinians to enjoy political self-determination in their homeland. The question of how to accommodate these rights is still unresolved.
In principle, there are only two possible ‘solutions’ to the problem. One is a single bi-national state over the whole of Palestine. The other is a partition of the land between the two peoples, so that each will have its own nation-state, in which it is a strong majority, while its members may live as a minority in the nation-state of the other people. A third possibility, of a neutral civic state, privatizing the national and religious affiliations of all its citizens, does not seem attractive to either side. To be practical, both solutions require some kind of a reconciliation that will give both peoples, and their members, adequate levels of physical and cultural security. Unfortunately, there are forces within both peoples who object to these solutions, and seek to undermine their prospects in various ways. These are the issues that any responsible political process among the parties will have to address. All I can say here is this:
Under present circumstances, there is a Jewish majority within pre-1967 Israel, but there is no such majority in Palestine as a whole. I see no moral justification and no political feasibility for continued Jewish control over the whole of the land, and its continued monopoly over its other resources. The present situation, under which the PA has jurisdiction over most of the Palestinian population, but has no effective control over the land, its resources and its borders, cannot be the basis of a stable, long-term political arrangement. Even if security considerations prevent, at this time, the establishment of a viable Palestinian state, Israel should make all necessary arrangements not to create a situation under which its possibility is maintained.
It is my firm belief that under the circumstances of the region, the only feasible solution for the foreseeable future is that of two nation-states living in peace next to each other. While Israel has legitimate security interests in minimizing the danger that it will be threatened by the Palestinians, it has an existential interest in facilitating effective self-determination for them. Additional Jewish settlement in the midst of Palestinian population seems a recipe for disaster, creating unnecessary barriers against a possible partition. On the other hand, the idea that a future Palestinian state will be, or can be, Jews-free, is unacceptable. The Jews who now live in areas which may in the future be within the Palestinian state should be allowed to choose whether to leave due to the changed political situation, or to stay within them.
In addition, all this discussion is political. It is misleading, even dangerous, to conduct it exclusively or mainly in terms of human rights protected by international law. Of course, there are aspects of human rights involved. But, as in most cases of serious human disputes, human rights talk in itself cannot resolve the issues. There are conflicts between rights and between rights and other legitimate interests. These conflicts need to be addressed, and they can only be addressed by negotiations.
Yes, Palestinians have a right to political self-determination in their homeland. But the realization of this right cannot be allowed to undermine the right of Jews to self-determination. It is sad that the refusal of the Arabs, understandable as it may be, prevented the 14th of May 1948 from being the Day of Independence of both the Jewish and the Arab states in Palestine. The fact that only the Jewish state was then founded is not the fault of the Jews. And the Jews can seek to ascertain that any agreement that is reached will contain sufficient guarantees that Israel’s power to defend itself is not seriously harmed. On the other hand, Israel will not gain security by an extended control over a large Palestinian population, which does not enjoy civil and political rights. These constraints, hopefully, will generate in both people a leadership that will reach an agreement that will benefit both of them and the region as a whole.
I will return now to Israel itself. Despite its complex social and political situation, Israel can maintain its democracy and its identity as the home of the Jewish people. The stronger its democratic features – the better will be the chances that the various groups within it can co-exist in its framework. This is why all these groups should accept the demands of democracy, and affirm the legitimacy of its basic institutions. I do not expect these groups to affirm democracy if they believe that such an affirmation contradicts their existential interests. My cautious optimism, when it exists, is based on my belief that each of them does get significant benefits from the continuation and stability of Israeli democracy. Nonetheless, it seems that the majority groups in Israel have not yet drawn the right balance in relations to the ‘strongest’ minorities – both Arabs and Haredim. Not enough is done to help them feel full members of the polity, and in turn they are not required to affirm a minimal sense of commitment and allegiance to the state which, after all is said and done, does give them reasonable levels of welfare, freedom and security. The failure exists for both groups, but is much more serious concerning the Arabs.
It is possible that, despite the difficulties in the political process culminating in over a year of violence between Israel and the Palestinians, and despite other sources of instability within Israel, the co-existence between groups within Israel will continue, and may even get stronger. There are strong forces, economic as well as social and political, which support the status quo and push towards making it more stable. However, such a development cannot be taken for granted. There are forces and processes, which make the situation quite volatile. Israel needs to think of ways to improve the prospects of stable co-existence between groups in Israel.
There is a large number of ominous signs. The short-lived Barak government (June 1999 to February 2001) lost its Knesset majority in the summer of 2000, as Barak left for the fateful Camp David summit. For complex reasons, the negotiations with the Palestinians collapsed, leading to the beginning of the second intifada (uprising) in the territories. At the beginning of the uprising, Israeli Arabs protested violently, and the riots escalated when two Arab youngsters were killed by the police. In a few days, main arteries were closed, and 14 people were killed, 13 of which Arabs. The shock upset the delicate fabric between Jews and Arabs in Israel, leading to an almost general ban on the 2001 elections in the Arab sector. These events are now being investigated by a special Commission of Inquiry. Since February 2001 Israel has a broad ‘unity’ government, headed by Ariel Sharon. The continuing violence, and the absence of a political horizon and negotiations, are eroding the hope and the sensitivity to the needs of the other within Israel and the region. The economic situation in the region is hard, with growing gaps within Israel and growing despair around it. The social and economic gaps within Israel converge, as we saw, with some of the ethnic and national rifts.
It seems that these facts require that a new ‘social covenant’ among the main parts of Israeli society about the conditions for their co-existence within a single political framework. All main three groups – secular Jews, religious Jews and Arabs – must make painful compromises to secure a shared political framework. As far as I can see, it is in the interest of all three groups to make the effort and find the necessary compromise, that may permit a long-term co-existence. I cannot identify the contours of such a compromise, because there are a number of possibilities that may be available. More important, a compromise cannot be real unless it is reached by a serious and equal negotiation among the parties concerned. It follows that we should resist the temptation to permit one group, the one to which we belong, capitalize on its present transitory advantage, since such ‘gimmicks’ may undermine the trust among the parties in an irreversible way. My purpose therefore is to stress the necessity of agreement, and to identify some of the constraints that every such agreement will have to meet.
In terms of the general structure of decision-making mechanisms and the shared political framework, it seems that Israel does need a written, formal and entrenched constitution, established in a process of broad negotiation and deliberation. This social contract may facilitate an agreement not on values, aspirations, narratives or conceptions of the good, but on a shared political framework, which will attend to the basic interests of all groups. The social contract (or at least the social understandings) must include three ingredients: a shared commitment to some framework rules; shared normative constraints such as respect for human rights; and an agreement concerning decision-making procedures which will include structured participation of representatives of all main groups within Israeli society.
The rationale behind my support for a constitution for Israel leads me to object to the constitutional process as it has been developing in the last decade. Within the Jewish groups, this process deepens the tensions between secular and religious instead of providing a political framework in which they can share. The process is led by a political group, which is secular, liberal and Western in orientation. It makes the court, which is a non-representative body belonging to the same group, an active political actor, and the court aspires to determine questions which should be left to the decision of the political system. It thus deepens resentment and frustration instead of providing a shared framework all can identify with. In terms of the Jewish-Arab tension, the court at best is a real asset, and at worst it does not improve things and legitimates the political status quo. In recent years, the court has delivered a number of decisions actively supporting Arabs’ claims for equality under the law. The Arabs will thus not have a problem with a Bill of Rights and judicial review. But they are usually left out of constitutional deliberations and debates. And the 1992 laws, which were dubbed by Aharon Barak ‘the constitutional revolution’, also declared that Israel is a Jewish and democratic state, something Arabs feel quite strongly about. The constitutional process consolidates the existing status quo in terms of political power, and this too is unattractive to Arabs (and other groups whose political strength is on the rise, such as the new immigrants from Russia and the oriental haredim). This status quo does not recognize the Arabs as a national minority, and does not recognize its collective rights or their claims to cultural and educational autonomy. It may well be that the solutions to these issues will not meet the demands of the Arabs, but if they participate in the negotiations inn a serious way, they can at least make demands concerning the constitutional entrenchment of some of these principles.
The 1992 basic laws did increase the visibility of the tensions between the Jewish and the democratic components in Israel’s self-definition. The laws generated, as we saw, some claims that the combination was impossible or unjustified. But on the whole they did not generate, to date, a sober and realistic discussion of the social complexity of the two main rifts affected by these tensions. It is not clear which of the rifts is the greater victim of this neglect. Among many Jews, the tension between Jewishness and democracy is seen as an internal Jewish tension. Secular, liberal Jews want ‘democracy’, while orthodox and national Jews want ‘a Jewish state’. As we saw, there are tensions among democracy and some senses of Jewishness, which are indeed related to the religious interpretation of ‘Jewishness’. However, concentrating on these tensions obscures the great variety of opinions among non-religious Zionist Jews concerning the Jewishness of Israel. Such exclusive reading tends to strengthen the pernicious and misleading perception as if secular Zionists have no interest in maintaining some Jewish distinctness to the state. It serves those who see Jewishness as a necessarily religious affiliation. However, Zionism will not survive in Israel if it does not affirm the possibility of non-religious Jewish identity, because it is among secular Jews that this identity is insecure. Thinking about the tension between Jewishness and democracy in exclusive Jewish terms also aids in the persistence of the distancing and the repression of the seriousness and intensity of the predicament of the non-Jewish minority, who is required to pledge allegiance to a state which excludes it, by definition, from full and equal partnership. Finally, seeing the tension as an internal Jewish problem prevents us from seeing the important relations between the two rifts - the Jewish one and the Jewish-Arab one. Xenophobia is not an exclusively religious phenomenon. It is true that religious wars take a place of pride in the history of group conflicts, but we have seen many group conflicts waged between people belonging to the same religion… Similarly, the fact that within Judaism (and most other religions) it is possible to find religious justifications, and even mandates, for religious holy wars, should not mislead us. Discriminatory and xenophobic attitudes towards Arabs are not the exclusive domain of religious Jews. The particularistic national-cultural conception of Judaism generates suspicion and fear towards Arabs as well, and a tendency to define the Arab as ‘the enemy’. These tendencies clearly are strengthened by the persistent violent conflict between the two peoples. Sentiments in the Western world after the September 11 2001 attacks on the US, as well as attitudes in Europe, are similarly complex, with religious, security, cultural and economic factors all intertwined.
Finding an acceptable and stable arrangement for Israel’s existential problems requires awareness to the complexity of the tensions between Jewishness and democracy. Such awareness creates new problems and highlights old ones, but it is on the whole beneficial and necessary. It is the only attitude that may guarantee that we offer and consider serious solutions, and not hide behind slogans which do not face and acknowledge the real problems we face.
One structural implication relates to the nature of the democratic regime that Israel must have. We draw a distinction between majoritarian and power-sharing democracies. England is still the paradigmatic example of a winner-takes-all situation, although even there the model does not seem to be working very well any more. The reason is quite obvious: majoritarian democracies may work well, and be quite effective, in homogenous societies without chronic minorities. In such societies, whoever is in power may well seek to implement their distinctive policies, because they’ll be judged by the sense of the population as a whole that the government promotes their interests. Even if there is a deep public debate around the identification of public interest and the public good, the population is sufficiently homogenous that no government can ignore the interests of large segments of it. The structural features of such societies mean that there are social constraints, which limit the powers of government. It is less likely to harm in a serious or irreversible ways democratic structures or the rights and interests of the opposition group, because there is a reasonable chance that the opposition will become the government in the near future. However, these structural guarantees are missing in deeply divided societies. They are especially weak for the protection of chronic minorities, especially those deemed threatening. Under such circumstances, a majority of both contending powers may unite to persecute and oppress the threatening minority. It follows that pure majoritarian democracy is ill-suited for deeply divided societies with chronic minorities, like Israel. In such societies, stable democracy requires structures of power sharing even during regular politics, and a victory in the elections should not be allowed to be seen as a mandate to implement the party program in its pure form. Clearly, there are institutional and structural implications to the analysis of Israeli society, which should be reflected in its constitutional structures and the type of democracy it should adopt.
This insight dictated the decision-making mechanism adopted to resolve differences among Jewish groups in the state’s early years. As we saw, the secular majority did not use its dominance to dictate arrangements, and refrained from separating state and religion as some of its leaders wanted. Instead, a constructive modus vivendi was sought between the various groups, giving each of them veto power over those arrangements that seemed crucial to them. In other countries, the same insight led to the creation of multi-cultural societies, and to constitutional structures which entrench power-sharing mechanisms between groups (such as in Belgium and Austria). Other rifted societies used federalist solutions, which combined a loose cohesiveness with autonomy and control of various groups within their own ‘units’. What is common to all such arrangements is that they require some basic understanding among all major groups about a political framework within which they can all coexist in a stable way. Su7ch understandings in turn require direct and detailed negotiations among the groups, and it further requires the entrenchment of the understandings in law or even ina constitution, where they will not be vulnerable to changing majorities. Clearly, these arrangements do not follow inevitably from moral or normative principles alone. They reflect also the realities of power. But only a serious process of negotiations will guarantee that the arrangements adopted are truly responsive to the needs and sensitivities of all the major groups. And that it contains a n adequate response to the major issues on the agenda.
It follows that I think that awareness to the complexities of the tensions between Jewishness and democracy in Israel should start all major groups in Israel on a serious process of reaching a ‘social contract’. The proposed contract should not be drafted by the ‘enlightened’ elites, even if they really try to respond to the needs of the other groups, including the Arabs and the haredim. The ‘others’ should themselves be offered the opportunity to participate fully in the process of deliberation and drafting. At the same time, these groups should not be allowed to have a veto power over the prospect of reaching such a covenant. And they should not be allowed to prevent a situation in which some shared basic principles are removed from the realm of ‘regular politics’, where everything is up for grabs.
Two things are crucial in this process. First, the agreement must be general, but it must also deal with the details. No one can make progress while making very vague and general statements, without committing oneself to specific arrangements. The Kinneret covenant, therefore, cannot stand on its own. This is not the kind of process I have in mind. The agreement must include reference to the main decision-making mechanisms, which will form the state’s material constitution. And it must be a ‘package deal’ in which each group can make gains while making concessions on other matters. It follows that the ‘package deal’ should be entrenched, so that it will not be vulnerable to changes by a simple majority, once the others have already made their concessions. Secondly, the body preparing this contract/constitution should be different and independent from the regular legislature, and the process of draft9ing, debating and ratification must also be independent of any particular Knesset.
Some may argue that such a process in Israel is doomed to fail, because a constitution cannot be enacted without certainty, and Israel does not face such a necessity at the moment. I beg to differ and say that the necessity does exist. True, there are groups whose interests it is to continue under the present arrangements, under which everything is regular politics. This is especially true of the haredim, whose political power in everyday politics is greater than their influence over basic preferences of the population. The Arabs, too, may be ambivalent about such a process, for slightly different reasons. Unlike the haredim, the Arabs have not been very successful in using their political power, since they are not considered legitimate partners for government. On the other hand, their political situation has consistently improved over the last 50 years. They may well reason that time may be working in their favor, so that they can get more in 10 years than they can get now. More important, they may feel that participating in such a process may grant Israel and its future constitution a legitimacy that they do not wish to impart on it.
For these reasons, and others, it may be impossible to reach a social contract or a constitution in Israel. If all major groups agree to participate in the process, however, this in itself may be quite an achievement. Besides, such processes may have their own dynamics. Maybe the representatives of the different groups will come to realize that, since they cannot stop the process, they had better participate and try to gain as much as they can. An inclusive process might there fore be a major contribution to civic cohesion in Israel even if it fails to generate an agreement.
Let me illustrate my claim that all major groups may indeed benefit from participating in such a process by looking at one of the most controversial arrangements in present-day Israel: The Law of Return. The Arab preference is clear: the principle of Jewish return should be eroded as far as possible. If they had their way, Jews would have no privileges in the field of immigration. On the face of it, all Jews, and all Jewish citizens who acquired their citizenship under the law of return, should be united against this position. This however is not the case, and Jewish interests themselves are mixed. Orthodox Jews believe that Jewish halachic identity is both necessary and sufficient to become a member of the Jewish state. They would like to minimize the application of the law to non-Jews under the halacha as they interpret it. They would therefore want to keep the religious definition of a Jew in the law of return, amended after the Shalit case, but limit the right of non-Jewish family members to immigrate. For secular Zionists, halachic Jewishness is neither sufficient nor necessary for membership. An anti-Zionist hared should not be eligible, because he does not aid the project of building a national home for Jews in Israel; and a person who has a national-cultural active Jewish identity despite the fact that the halacha does not see him as Jewish (say, because he was born to a Jewish father, not a Jewish mother) is to them a very welcome candidate. Finally, all Jews committed to the ideal of democracy must also require that people acquiring Israel’s citizenship should be required to affirm a commitment to the principles of democracy. In other words, various groups of Jews do have an interest to change the present immigration arrangements under the law of return. In addition, we saw that the present legal situation has the additional disadvantage of forcing the state and the courts to decide questions of religion and identity. Many believe that these are questions which are not amenable to legal resolution, and which threaten to give the state’s support to a certain religious interpretation, thus alienating all those who do not share it. Consequently, many may prefer an immigration arrangement, which will not require the courts to decide controversial religious and ideological issues.
This complex picture suggests that it may be possible to agree on an immigration policy, which might offer all groups some substantial advantages over the existing legal situation. Immigration will be dealt with under general laws, which will not refer to national affiliation. All people acquiring Israeli citizenship will have to go through a period of adaptation. No one will acquire Israeli citizenship immediately and automatically. Naturalization will require, as it does in most other countries, some familiarity with Israel, its language, laws and culture. It will further require an oath of allegiance to the country and its democratic regime. There will be a debate about the principle of Return. It is likely that at this stage, a large majority will insist that it is kept. But it should relate to members of the Jewish people, and the criterion should not be exclusively religious. The decision should be made by the political system, and it should be inclusive. But the right to immigrate (and not necessarily to citizenship) should be granted only to those who are themselves members of the Jewish people, and to their nuclear families. Other members of the family should be eligible to policies of family reunion, which should be applied equally to all applicants, within the general constraints of the capacity and the needs of the country.
On the face of it, this arrangement should not be attractive to any of the groups, because it does not meet their political and ideological demands. But under present circumstances, it is unlikely that any single group may entrench in laws all of its preferences and aspirations. The proposed arrangements gives each of the groups some advantages over the existing situation, plus it gives all of them a promise of better relations with the other groups. Under the proposed arrangement, each of the Jewish groups will be free to give its own answer to Who is a Jew. Orthodox will not be compelled to recognize the Jewishness of those who were converted in a reform ceremony, and reform Jews will not be excluded by orthodox ones. The state will decide who is eligible to Return, and this will be a political, not an ideological decision. All residents of the state will be entitled to basic rights such as marriage and burial, irrespective of their religious affiliation. Despite the narrowing down of those eligible for return, it is likely that the percentage of people affiliated with the Jewish people among those who immigrate will rise. It will be harder for non-Jews who are members of families of Jews for three generations to immigrate unless they have an independent tie to the Jewish people. If they do – the rationale of Return does apply to them. Family reunion arrangements, on the other hand, will be equal and limited, to make sure that Israel does not lose control over immigration to it, especially of family members of Palestinians. In addition, this arrangement may limit the number of Israeli citizens who live abroad, after getting automatic citizenship and leaving for absorption difficulties. Only those olim who in fact adapt to living in Israel will in fact get its citizenship. People will acquire the state’s citizenship only if they have lived in it for some time, and have the ability and the capacity to live in it and contribute to it. It seems to me that the complex of these outcomes is desirable to those who are interested in the strength and welfare of Israel, and to those interested in the autonomy of its religious groups in determining membership in them. It is also welcome to those who want to strengthen the civic affiliation to the state, irrespective of religious or national affiliation. And also to those who want to maintain, and even strengthen, the Jewish distinctness of Israel as a Jewish nation-state.
This is one illustration of an arrangement that might provide a better balance than existing arrangements between the aspirations of Israel to be the nation state of Jews and its commitment to be the state of all its citizens and residents, irrespective of religious or national affiliation. In this social contract, no group will come out fully satisfied. But the contract may give each of the groups both arrangements it does not have now, and that it is unlikely to have without such a comprehensive package deal, and a commitment to the relative stability of their gains.
The Arabs will have to come to terms with the fact that for the foreseeable future, they will live as a minority in a country whose ethos and public culture are Hebrew and Jewish. If they are willing to concede the legitimacy of this state, and the legitimacy of the Jewish claim for self-determination, they may get a parallel recognition of their own right to cultural self-determination, of the harm done to them by the foundation of the state, of their right to participate in political decision-making and of their right to a fair share of the country's resources. The national and cultural affinity of the Palestinian citizens of Israel and their brethren outside Israel also needs to be recognized. But this becomes much more difficult so long as the relations between Israel and the Palestinians consist of violent conflict, and so long as Israel effectively controls all of the area between the Jordan and the sea.
The non-orthodox Jewish majority must accept that it cannot enact a majoritarian decision concerning collective identity. The orthodox minority, on the other hand, should remember that it is a minority. It will not always be the case that it will be the decisive parliamentary bloc. And once there is an effective government without them – they should fear a situation under which their basic rights and red lines are vulnerable to majority decisions. All groups should remember that a systemic and structured gap between sharing burdens and claiming rights is not stable. Similarly, huge gaps between the incomes and wealth of citizens, especially when they converge with ethnic and religious divides, are extremely dangerous. The state should make every effort to reduce these sources of unrest and instability, and to create a better fit between burdens, participation and contribution.
Finally, Israel must recognize that the two rifts discussed in this book – that between Jewish conceptions of the Jewishness of the state and that between Jews and Arabs - are of equal importance and are intimately related. It is urgent that adequate responses are found to the issue raised in both of them. Even if these issues cannot be solved at one go or even in one generations – there should be a clear vision of the direction in which Israel must move to survive. It is crucial to strengthen the civic bonds of all citizens to their state. Only the creation of real space for a dignified and significant citizenship for non-Jews can ensure that Israel can continue to have some Jewish distinctness, but still be both democratic and just. At the same time, it is legitimate for Israel, as the only state in the world where Jewish-Hebrew culture is hegemonic, to strengthen this public culture and to deepen it. Making national-cultural Jewish identity, which is non-religious, deeper and richer in Israel may contribute to Jewish solidarity, shared as it may be by religious and non-religious alike. At the same time, Israel should stress a shared core of universal values and of skills to participate and compete in contemporary economies for all its educational systems.
An attempt to force on the Jewish people as a whole a single, orthodox, conception of Judaism will not increase unity among the people. To the contrary, it may create division and alienation. The test of the survival of the Jewish people, in Israel and abroad, is a complex matter of historical fact. A strong and robust Israel is an important ingredient in this process. But it is crucial to distinguish between the state of Israel and the Jewish people, and between the state of Israel and Jewish religion. Such distinctions are not only necessary to maintain a decent level of democracy, stability and justice toward non-Jews. It is as important for the improvement of Israel’s ability to contribute to the maintenance of a distinct Jewish identity, for those who are interested in it, both in Israel and in the diaspora.
